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Abstract— This paper explores the privacy of cloud out-
sourced Model Predictive Control (MPC) for a linear system
with input constraints. In our cloud-based architecture, a
client sends her private states to the cloud who performs the
MPC computation and returns the control inputs. In order
to guarantee that the cloud can perform this computation
without obtaining anything about the client’s private data, we
employ a partially homomorphic cryptosystem. We propose
protocols for two cloud-MPC architectures motivated by the
current developments in the Internet of Things: a client-server
architecture and a two-server architecture. In the first case, a
control input for the system is privately computed by the cloud
server, with the assistance of the client. In the second case,
the control input is privately computed by two independent,
non-colluding servers, with no additional requirements from
the client. We prove that the proposed protocols preserve the
privacy of the client’s data and of the resulting control input.
Furthermore, we compute bounds on the errors introduced
by encryption. We present numerical simulations for the two
architectures and discuss the trade-off between communication,
MPC performance and privacy.
I. INTRODUCTION
The increase in the number of connected devices, as well
as their reduction in size and resources, determined a growth
in the utilization of cloud-based services, in which a central-
ized powerful server offers on demand storage, processing
and delivery capabilities to users. With the development of
communication efficient algorithms, outsourcing computa-
tions to the cloud becomes very convenient. However, issues
regarding the privacy of the shared data arise, as the users
have no control over the actions of the cloud, which can leak
or abuse the data it receives.
Model Predictive Control (MPC) is a powerful scheme that
is successfully deployed in practice [1] for systems of vary-
ing dimension and architecture, including cloud platforms. In
competitive scenarios, such as energy generation in the power
grid, domestic scenarios, such as heating control in smart
houses, or time-sensitive scenarios, such as traffic control,
the control scheme should come with privacy guarantees
to protect from eavesdroppers or from an untrustworthy
cloud. For instance, in smart houses, client-server setups can
be envisioned, where a local trusted computer aggregates
the measurements from the sensors, but does not store
their model and specifications and depends on a server to
compute the control input or reference. The server can also
posses other information, such as the weather. In a heating
application, the parameters of the system can be known by
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the server, i.e., the energy consumption model of the house,
but the data measurements and how much the owner wants
to consume should be private. In traffic control, the drivers
are expected to share their locations, which should remain
private, but are not expected to contribute to the computation.
Hence, the locations are collected and processed only at a
single server’s level, e.g., in a two-server setup, which then
sends the result back to the cars or to traffic lights.
Although much effort has been dedicated in this direction,
a universally secure scheme that is able to perform locally,
at the cloud level, any given functionality on the users’
data has not been developed yet [2]. For a single user and
functionalities that can be described by boolean functions,
fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) [3], [4] guarantees
privacy, but at high storage and complexity requirements [5].
For multiple users, the concept of functional privacy is
required, which can be attained by functional encryption [6],
which was developed only for limited functionalities. More
tractable solutions that involve multiple interactions between
the participating parties to ensure the confidentiality of the
users’ data have been proposed. In client-server computa-
tions, where the users have a trusted machine, called the
client, that performs computations of smaller intensity than
the server, we mention partially homomorphic encryption
(PHE) [7] and differential privacy (DP) [8]. In two-server
computations, in which the users share their data to two
non-colluding servers, the following solutions are available:
secret sharing [9], [10], garbled circuits [11], [12], Goldreich-
Micali-Wigderson protocol [13], PHE [14].
A. Contributions
In this paper, we discuss the implicit MPC computation
for a linear system with input constraints, where we privately
compute a control input, while maintaining the privacy of the
state, using a cryptosystem that is partially homomorphic,
i.e., supports additions of encrypted data. In the first case
we consider, the control input is privately computed by a
server, with the help of the client. In the second case, the
computation is performed by two non-colluding servers. The
convergence of the state trajectory to the reference is public
knowledge, so it is crucial to not reveal anything else about
the state and other sensitive quantitities. Therefore, we use a
privacy model that stipulates that no computationally efficient
algorithm run by the cloud can infer anything about the
private data, or, in other words, an adversary doesn’t know
more about the private data than a random guess. Although
this model is very strict, it thoroughly characterizes the loss
of information.
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This work explores fundamental issues of privacy in
control: the trade-off between computation, communication,
performance and privacy. We present two main contributions:
proposing two privacy-preserving protocols for MPC and
evaluating the errors induced by the encryption.
B. Related work
In control systems, ensuring the privacy of the mea-
surements and control inputs from eavesdroppers and from
the controller has been so far tackled with differential pri-
vacy, homomorphic encryption and transformation methods.
Kalman filtering with DP was addressed in [15], current
trajectory hiding in [16], linear distributed control [17], and
distributed MPC in [18]. The idea of encrypted controllers
was introduced in [19] and [20], using PHE, and in [21]
using FHE. Kalman filtering with PHE was further ex-
plored in [22]. Optimization problems with DP are addressed
in [23], [24] and PHE in [25], [26], [27], [28]. Many works
proposed privacy through transformation methods that use
multiplicative masking. While the computational efficiency
of such methods is desirable, their privacy cannot be rigor-
ously quantified, as required by our privacy model, since the
distribution of the masked values is not uniform [29].
Recent work in [30] has tackled the problem of privately
computing the input for a constrained linear system using
explicit MPC, in a client-server setup. There, the client
performs the computationally intensive trajectory localization
and sends the result to the server, which then evaluates the
corresponding affine control law on the encrypted state using
PHE. Although explicit MPC has the advantage of computing
the parametric control laws offline, the evaluation of the
search tree at the cloud’s level is intractable when the number
of nodes is large, since all nodes have to be evaluated in order
to not reveal the polyhedra the in which the state lies, and
comparison cannot be performed locally on encrypted data.
Furthermore, the binary search in explicit MPC is intensive
and requires the client to store all the characterization of the
polyhedra, which we would like to avoid. Taking this into
consideration, we focus on implicit MPC.
The performance degradation of a linear controller due to
encryption is analyzed in [31]. In our work, we investigate
performance degradation for the nonlinear control obtained
from MPC.
II. PROBLEM SETUP
We consider a discrete-time linear time-invariant system:
x(t+ 1) = Ax(t) +Bu(t), (1)
with the state x ∈ X ⊆ Rn and the control input u ∈
U ⊆ Rm. The optimal control receding horizon problem
with constraints on the states and inputs can be written as:
J∗N (x(t)) = min
u0,...,N−1
1
2
(
xᵀNPxN +
N−1∑
k=0
xᵀkQxk + u
ᵀ
kRuk
)
s.t. xk+1 = Axk +Buk, k = 0, . . . , N − 1 (2)
xk ∈ X , uk ∈ U , k = 0, . . . , N − 1
xN ∈ Xf , x0 = x(t),
where N is the length of the horizon and P,Q,R  0
are cost matrices. For reasons related to error bounding,
explained in Section VI, in this paper, we consider input
constrained systems: X = Rn, 0 ∈ U = {−lu  u  hu},
and impose stability without a terminal state constraint, i.e.
Xf = Rn, but with appropriately chosen costs P,Q,R
and horizon N such that the closed-loop system has robust
performance to bounded errors due to encryption, which will
be described in Section VI. A survey on the conditions for
stability of MPC is given in [32].
Through straightforward manipulations, (2) can be writ-
ten as a quadratic program (see details on obtaining the
matrices H and F in [33, Ch. 8,11]) in the variable
U := [u0 u1 . . . uN−1]
ᵀ.
U∗(x(t)) = argmin
U∈U
1
2
UᵀHU + UᵀF ᵀx(t) (3)
For simplicity, we keep the same notation for the aug-
mented constraint set U . After obtaining the optimal solution,
the first m components of U∗(x(t)) are applied as input
to the system (1): u∗(x(t)) = (U∗(x(t)))1:m. This problem
easily extends to the case of following a reference.
A. Solution without privacy requirements
The constraint set U is a hyperbox, so the projection
step required for solving (3) has a simple closed form
solution and the optimization problem can be efficiently
solved with the projected Fast Gradient Method (FGM) [34],
given in Algorithm 1. The objective function is strongly
convex, since H  0, therefore we can use the constant step
sizes L = λmax(H) and η = (
√
κ(H)− 1)/(√κ(H) + 1),
where κ(H) is the condition number of H . Warm starting
can be used at subsequent time steps of the receding horizon
problem by using part of the previous solution UK to
construct a feasible initial iterate of the new optimization
problem.
ALGORITHM 1: Projected Fast Gradient Descent
Input: H,F, x(t),U , L, κ(H), η, U0 ∈ U , z0 = U0,K
Output: UK(x(t))
1: for k=0. . . ,K-1 do
2: tk = (INm − 1LH)zk − 1LF ᵀx(t)
3: U ik+1 =

−liu, if tik < −liu
tik, if t
i
k ∈ [−liu, hiu]
hiu, if tik > h
i
u
, i = 1, . . . , Nm
4: zk+1 = (1 + η)Uk+1 − ηUk
5: end for
B. Privacy objectives
The unsecure cloud-MPC problem is depicted in Figure 1.
The system’s constant parameters A,B, P,Q,R,N are pub-
lic, motivated by the fact the parameters are intrinsic to the
system and hardware, and could be guessed or identified;
however, the measurements, control inputs and constraints
are not known and should remain private. The goal of this
work is to devise private cloud-outsourced versions of Algo-
rithm 1 such that the client obtains the control input u∗(t)
2
for system (1) with only a minimum amount of computation.
The cloud (consisting of either one or two servers) should
not infer anything else than what was known prior to the
computation about the measurements x(t), the control inputs
u∗(t) and the constraints U . We tolerate semi-honest servers,
meaning that they correctly follow the steps of the protocol
but may store the transcript of the messages exchanged and
process the data received to try to learn more information
than allowed.
Fig. 1. Unsecure MPC: the system model A,B, horizon N and costs P , Q,
R are public. The state x(t), control input u∗(t) and input constraints U are
privacy-sensitive. The red lines represent entities that can be eavesdropped.
To formalize the privacy objectives, we introduce the
privacy definitions that we want our protocols to satisfy,
described in [35, Ch. 3], [36, Ch. 7]. In what follows, {0, 1}∗
defines a sequence of bits of unspecified length. Given a
countable index set I , an ensemble X = {Xi}i∈I , indexed
by I , is a sequence of random variables Xi, for all i ∈ I .
Definition 1: The ensembles X = {Xn}n∈N and Y =
{Yn}n∈N are statistically indistinguishable, denoted s≡, if
for every positive polynomial p and all sufficiently large n,
the following holds, where Ω = Supp(X) ∪ Supp(Y ):
1/2
∑
α∈Ω
|Pr[Xn = α]− Pr[Yn = α]| < 1/p(n).
Two ensembles are called computationally indistinguish-
able if no efficient algorithm can distinguish between them.
This is a weaker version of statistical indistinguishability.
Definition 2: The ensembles X = {Xn}n∈N and
Y = {Yn}n∈N are computationally indistinguishable, de-
noted
c≡, if for every probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm
D : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}, called the distinguisher, every positive
polynomial p, and all sufficiently large n, the following
holds:∣∣Prx←Xn [D(x) = 1]− Pry←Yn [D(y) = 1]∣∣ < 1/p(n).
The definition of two-party privacy says that a protocol
privately computes the functionality it runs if all information
obtained by a party after the execution of the protocol, while
also keeping a record of the intermediate computations, can
be obtained only from the inputs and outputs of that party.
Definition 3: Let f : ({0, 1}∗)2 → ({0, 1}∗)2 be a func-
tionality, and fi(x1, x2) be the ith component of f(x1, x2),
i = 1, 2. Let Π be a two-party protocol for computing f . The
view of the ith party during an execution of Π on the inputs
(x1, x2), denoted by V Πi (x1, x2), is (xi, coins,m1, . . . ,mt),
where coins represents the outcome of the ith party’s internal
coin tosses, and mj represents the jth message it has
received. For a deterministic functionality f , we say that Π
privately computes f if there exist probabilistic polynomial-
time algorithms, called simulators, denoted by Si, such that:
{Si(xi, fi(x1, x2))}x1,2∈{0,1}∗
c≡ {V Πi (x1, x2)}x1,2∈{0,1}∗ .
When the privacy is one-sided, i.e., only the part of the pro-
tocol executed by party 2 has to not reveal any information,
the above equation has to be satisfied only for i = 2.
The purpose of the paper is to design protocols with the
functionality of Algorithm 1 that satisfy Definition 3. To this
end, we use the encryption scheme defined in Section III.
Furthermore, we discuss in Section VI how we connect the
domain of the inputs in Definiton 3 with the domain of real
numbers needed for the MPC problem. In Sections IV and V,
we address two private cloud-MPC solutions that present a
trade-off between the computational effort at the client and
the total time required to compute the solution u∗(t), which
is analyzed in Section VI.
The MPC literature has focused on reducing the com-
putational effort through computing a suboptimal solution
to implicit MPC [37], [38]. Such time optimizations, i.e.,
stopping criteria, reveal information about the private data,
such as how far is the initial point from the optimum or the
difference between consecutive iterates. Therefore, in this
work, we consider a given fixed number of iterations K.
III. PARTIALLY HOMOMORPHIC CRYPTOSYSTEM
Partially homomorphic encryption schemes can support
additions between encrypted data, such as Paillier [7] and
Goldwasser-Micali [39], DGK [40], or multiplications be-
tween encrypted data, such as El Gamal [41] and unpadded
RSA [42].
In this paper, we use the Paillier cryptosystem [7], which is
an asymmetric additively homomorphic encryption scheme.
The message space for the Paillier scheme is ZNσ , where Nσ
is a large integer that is the product of two prime numbers
p, q. The pair of keys corresponding to this cryptosystem is
(pk, sk), where the public key is pk = (Nσ, g), with g ∈
ZN2σ having order Nσ and the secret key is sk = (γ, δ):
γ = lcm(p−1, q−1), δ = ((gγ mod N2σ−1)/Nσ)−1 mod Nσ.
For a message a ∈ ZNσ , called plaintext, the Pailler
encryption primitive is defined as:
[[a]] := garNσ mod N2σ , with r random value in ZNσ .
The encrypted messages are called ciphertexts.
A probabilistic encryption scheme, i.e., that takes random
numbers in the encryption primitive, does not preserve the
order from the plaintext space to the ciphertext space.
Intuitively, the additively homomorphic property states
that there exists an operator ⊕ defined on the space of
encrypted messages, with:
[[a]]⊕ [[b]] = [[a+ b]], ∀a, b ∈ ZNσ ,
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where the equality holds in modular arithmetic, w.r.t. N2σ .
Formally, the decryption primitive is a homomorphism be-
tween the group of ciphertexts, with the operator ⊕ and the
group of plaintexts with addition +.
The scheme also supports subtraction between ciphertexts,
and multiplication between a plaintext and an encrypted
message, obtained by adding the encrypted messages for the
corresponding (integer) number of times: b⊗ [[a]] = [[ba]].
We will use the same notation to denote encryptions, addi-
tions and multiplication by vectors and matrices.
Proving privacy in the semi-honest model of a protocol
that makes use of cryptosystems involves the concept of
semantic security. Under the assumption of decisional com-
posite residuosity [7], the Paillier cryptosystem is semanti-
cally secure and has indistinguishable encryptions, which,
in essence, means that an adversary cannot distinguish be-
tween the ciphertext [[a]] and a ciphertext [[b]] based on the
messages a and b [36, Ch. 5].
Definition 4: An encryption scheme with encryption
primitive E(·) is semantically secure if for every probabilis-
tic polynomial-time algorithm, A, there exists a probabilistic
polynomial-time algorithm A′ such that for every two poly-
nomially bounded functions f, h : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}∗ and for
any probability ensemble {Xn}n∈N, |Xn| ≤ poly(n), for
any positive polynomial p and sufficiently large n:
Pr [A(E(Xn), h(Xn)) = f(Xn)] <
Pr [A′(h(Xn)) = f(Xn)] + 1/p(n).
Cloud-based Linear Quadratic Regulator: We provide a
simple example of how the Paillier encryption can be used in
a private control application. If the problem is unconstrained,
i.e., U = Rm, a stabilizing controller can be computed as
a linear quadratic regulator [33, Ch. 8]. Such a controller
can be computed only by one server. The client sends
the encrypted state [[x(t)]] to the server, which recursively
computes the plaintext control gain and solution to the
Discrete Riccati Equations, with PN = P :
Fk = −(BᵀPk+1B +R)−1BᵀPk+1A, k = N − 1, . . . , 0
Pk = A
ᵀPk+1A+Q+AᵀPk+1BFk,
[[u∗(t)]] = F0 ⊗ [[x(t)]].
The server obtains the encrypted control input and returns it
to the client, which decrypts and inputs it to the system.
To summarize, PHE allows a party that does not have the
private key to perform linear operations on encrypted integer
data. For instance, a cloud-based Linear Quadratic Controller
can be computed entirely by one server, because the control
action is linear in the state. Nonlinear operations are not
supported within this cryptosystem, but can be achieved with
communication between the party that has the encrypted data
and the party that has the private key, and we will use this
in Sections IV and V.
IV. CLIENT-SERVER ARCHITECTURE
To be able to use the Paillier encryption, we need to rep-
resent the messages on a finite set of integers, parametrized
by Nσ , i.e., each message is an element in ZNσ . Usually,
the values less than Nσ/3 are interpreted to be positive, the
numbers between 2Nσ/3 and Nσ to be negative, and the rest
of the range allows for overflow detection. In this section and
Section V, we consider a fixed-point representation of the
values and perform implicit multiplication steps to obtain
integers and division steps to retrieve the true values. We
analyze the implications of the fixed-point representation
over the MPC solution in Section VI.
Notation: Given a real quantity x ∈ R, we use the notation
x¯ for the corresponding quantity in fixed-point representation
on one sign bit, li integer and lf fractional bits.
We introduce a client-server model, depicted in Figure 2.
We present an interactive protocol that privately computes the
control input for the client, while maintaining the privacy of
the state in Protocol 2. The Paillier encryption is not order
preserving, so the projection operation cannot be performed
locally by the server. Hence, the server sends the encrypted
iterate [[tk]] for the client to project it. Then, the client
encrypts the feasible iterate and sends it back to the cloud.
Fig. 2. Private client-server MPC setup for a plant.
We drop the (¯·) from the iterates in order to not burden
the notation.
PROTOCOL 2: Encrypted projected Fast Gradient Descent
in a client-server architecture
Input: C: x(t),Kc,Kw, li, lf , U¯ , pk, sk; S: H¯f , F¯ , η¯,Kc,Kw, li,
lf , pk, cold-start, [[Uw]]
Output: C: u = (UK(x(t)))1:m
1: C: Encrypt and send [[x(t)]] to S
2: if cold-start then
3: S: [[U0]] = [[0Nm]]; C, S: K ← Kc
4: else
5: S: [[U0]] =
[
[[(Uw)m+1:Nm]], [[0m]]
]
; C, S: K ← Kw
6: end if
7: S: [[z0]] = [[U0]]
8: for k=0. . . ,K-1 do
9: S: [[tk]] = (INm − H¯f ) ⊗ [[zk]] ⊕ (−F¯ ᵀf ) ⊗ [[x(t)]] and
send it to C
10: C: Decrypt tk and truncate to lf fractional bits
11: C: Uk+1 = ΠU¯ (tk) . Projection on U¯
12: C: Encrypt and send [[Uk+1]] to S
13: S: [[zk+1]] = (1 + η¯)⊗ [[Uk+1]]⊕ (−η¯)⊗ [[Uk]]
14: end for
15: C: Decrypt and output u = (UK)1:m
Theorem 1: Protocol 2 achieves privacy as in Definition 3
with respect to a semi-honest server.
Proof: The initial value of the iterate does not give any
information to the server about the result, as the final result
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is encrypted and the number of iterations is a priori fixed.
The view of the server, as in Definition 3, is composed of
the server’s inputs, the messages received {[[Uk]]}k=0,...,K ,
which are all encrypted, and no output. We construct a
simulator which replaces the messages with random encryp-
tions of corresponding length. Due to the semantic security
(see Definition 4) of the Paillier cryptosystem, which was
proved in [7], the view of the simulator is computationally
indistinguishable from the view of the server.
V. TWO-SERVER ARCHITECTURE
Although in Protocol 2, the client needs to store and pro-
cess substantially less data than the server, the computational
requirements might be too stringent for large values of K
and Nσ . In such a case, we outsource the problem to two
servers, and only require the client to encrypt x(t) and send
it to one server and decrypt the received the result [[u∗]].
In this setup, depicted in Figure 3, the existence of two
non-colluding servers is assumed.
In Figure 3 and in Protocol 3, we will denote by [[·]]
a message encrypted with pk1 and by [{·}] a message
encrypted by pk2. The reason we use two pairs of keys is so
the client and support server do not have the same private
key and do not need to interact.
Fig. 3. Private two-server MPC setup for a plant.
As before, we need an interactive protocol to achieve the
projection. We use the DGK comparison protocol, proposed
in [40], [43], such that, given two encrypted values of l
bits [[a]], [[b]] to S1, after the protocol, S2, who has the
private key, obtains a bit (β = 1) ≡ (a ≤ b), without
finding anything about the inputs. Moreover, S1 finds nothing
about β. We augment this protocol by introducing a step
before the comparison in which S1 randomizes the order of
the two values to be compared, such that S2 does not know
the significance of β with respect to the inputs. Furthermore,
by performing a blinded exchange, S1 obtains the minimum
(respectively, maximum) value of the two inputs, without any
of the two servers knowing what the result is. The above
procedure is performed in lines 11–16 in Protocol 3. More
details can be found in [44].
The comparison protocol works with inputs that are rep-
resented on l bits. The variables we compare are results of
additions and multiplications, which can increase the number
of bits, thus, we need to ensure that they are represented on
l bits before inputting them to the comparison protocol. This
introduces an extra step in line 10 in which S1 communicates
with S2 in order to obtain the truncation of the comparison
inputs: S1 adds noise to tk and sends it to S2 which decrypts
it, truncates the result to l bits and sends it back. S1 then
subtracts the truncated noise.
In order to guarantee that S2 does not find out the private
values after decryption, S1 adds a sufficiently large random
noise to the private data. The random numbers in lines 13
and 19 are chosen from (0, 2l+λσ ) ∩ ZNσ , which ensures
the statistical indistinguishability between the sum of the
random number and the private value and a random number
of equivalent length [45], where λσ is the statistical security
parameter.
PROTOCOL 3: Encrypted projected Fast Gradient Descent
in a two-server architecture
Input: C : x(t), pk1,2, sk2;S1 : H¯f , F¯ , η¯,Kc,Kw, li, lf , pk1,2,
cold-start, [[Uw]];S2 : Kc,Kw, li, lf , pk1,2, sk1, cold-start
Output: C: u = (UK(x(t)))1:m
1: C: Encrypt and send [[x(t)]], [[hu]], [[−lu]] to S1
2: if cold-start then
3: S1: [[U0]]← [[0Nm]]; S1, S2:K ← Kc
4: else
5: S1: [[U0]]←
[
[[(Uw)m+1:Nm]], [[0m]]
]
; S1, S2:K ← Kw
6: end if
7: S1: [[z0]]← [[U0]]
8: for k=0. . . ,K-1 do
9: S1: [[tk]]← (INm − H¯f )⊗ [[zk]]⊕ (−F¯ ᵀf )⊗ [[x(t)]]
10: S1: [[tk]]← truncate [[tk]]
11: S1: ak, bk ← randomize [[tk]], [[hu]]
12: S1, S2: DGK s.t. S2 obtains (βk = 1) ≡ (ak ≤ bk)
13: S1: Pick rk, sk and send [[ak]]⊕ [[rk]], [[bk]]⊕ [[sk]] to S2
14: S2: Send back [[βk]] and [[vk]] ← [[ak + rk]] ⊕ [[0]] if
βk = 1 or [[vk]]← [[bk + sk]]⊕ [[0]] if βk = 0
15: S1: [[Uk+1]]← [[vk]]⊕sk⊗ ([[βk]]⊕ [[−1]])⊕ rk⊗ [[βk]]
. Uk+1 ← min(tk, hu)
16: S1, S2: Redo 11–15 to get [[Uk+1]]← max(Uk+1,−lu)
17: S1: [[zk+1]]← (1 + η¯)⊗ [[Uk+1]]⊕ (−η¯)⊗ [[Uk]]
18: end for
19: S1: Pick ρ and send [[(UK)1:m]]⊕ [[ρ]] to S2
20: S2: Decrypt, encrypt with pk2 and send to S1: [{u+ ρ}]
21: S1: [{u}]← [{u+ ρ}]⊕ [{−ρ}] and send it to C
22: C: Decrypt and output u
Theorem 2: Protocol 3 achieves privacy as in Definition 3,
as long as the two semi-honest servers do not collude.
Proof: The view of S1 is composed by its inputs and
exchanged messages, and no output. All the messages the
first server receives are encrypted (the same holds for the
subprotocol DGK). Furthermore, in line 14, an encryption
of zero is added to the quantity S1 receives such that the
encryption is re-randomized and S1 cannot recognize it.
Due to the semantic security of the cryptosystems, the view
of S1 is computationally indistinguishable from the view
of a simulator which follows the same steps as S1, but
replaces the incoming messages by random encryptions of
corresponding length.
The view of S2 is composed by its inputs and exchanged
messages, and no output. Apart from the comparison bits,
the latter are always blinded by noise that has at least λσ
bits more than the private data being sent. For λσ chosen
appropriately large (e.g. 100 bits [45]), the following is true:
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a+r
s≡ r′, where a is a value of p bits, r is the noise chosen
uniformly at random from (0, 2p+λσ )∩ZNσ and r′ is a value
chosen uniformly at random from (0, 2p+λσ+1)∩ZNσ . In the
DGK subprotocol, a similar blinding is performed, see [46].
Crucially, the noise selected by S1 is different at each
iteration. Hence, S2 cannot extract any information by com-
bining messages from multiple iterations, as they are always
blinded by a different large enough noise. Moreover, the
randomization step in line 11 ensures that S2 cannot infer
anything from the values of βk, as the order of the inputs
is unknown. Thus, we construct a simulator that follows the
same steps as S2, but instead of the received messages, it ran-
domly generates values of appropriate length, corresponding
to the blinded private values, and random bits corresponding
to the comparison bits. The view of such a simulator will be
computationally indistinguishable from the view of S2.
Remark 1: One can expand Protocols 2 and 3 over mul-
tiple time steps, such that U0 is obtained from the previous
iteration and not given as input, and formally prove their
privacy. The fact that the state will converge to a neighbor-
hood of the origin is public knowledge, and is not revealed
by the execution of the protocol. A more detailed proof that
explicitly constructs the simulators can be found in [44].
Through communication, encryption and statistical blind-
ing, the two servers can privately compute nonlinear opera-
tions. However, this causes an increase in the computation
time due to the extra encryptions and decryptions and com-
munication rounds, as will be pointed out in Section VII.
VI. FIXED-POINT ARITHMETICS MPC
The values that are encrypted or added to or multiplied
with encrypted values have to be integers. We consider
fixed-point representations with one sign bit, li integer bits
and lf fractional bits and multiply them by 2lf to obtain
integers.
Working with fixed-point representations can lead to over-
flow, quantization and arithmetic round-off errors. Thus,
we want to compute the deviation between the fixed-point
solution and optimal solution of Algorithm 1. The bounds on
this deviation can be used in an offline step prior to the online
computation to choose an appropriate fixed-point precision
for the performance of the system.
Consider the following assumption:
Assumption 1: The number of fractional bits lf and con-
stant c ≥ 1 are chosen large enough such that:
(i) U¯ ⊆ U : the fixed-point precision solution is still feasible.
(ii) The eigenvalues of the fixed-point representation H¯f are
contained in the set (0, 1], where
Hf := H¯/(cL¯) and L¯ := λmax(H¯).
The constant c is required in order to overcome the
possibility that (1/L¯)H¯ has the maximum eigenvalue
larger than 1 due to fixed-point arithmetic errors.
(iii) The fixed-point representation of the step size satisfies:
0 ≤
(√
κ(H¯)− 1
)/(√
κ(H¯) + 1
)
≤ η¯ < 1.
Item (i) ensures that the feasibility of the fixed-point
precision solution is preserved, item (ii) ensures that the
strong convexity of the fixed-point objective function still
holds and item (iii) ensures that the fixed-point step size is
such that the FGM converges.
Overflow errors: Bounds on the infinity-norm on the
fixed-point dynamic quantities of interest in Algorithm 1
were derived in [47] for each iteration k, and depend on
a bounded set X0 such that x(t) ∈ X0 and x¯(t) ∈ X¯0:
||U¯k+1||∞ ≤ max{||l¯u||∞, ||h¯u||∞} = RU¯
||z¯k+1||∞ ≤ (1 + 2η¯)RU¯ := ζ,
||t¯k||∞ ≤ ||INm − H¯f ||∞ζ + ||F¯f ||∞RX¯0 ,
where Ff = F¯ /(cL¯) and RS represents the radius of a set
S w.r.t. the infinity norm. We select from these bounds the
number of integer bits li such that there is no overflow.
A. Difference between real and fixed-point solution
We want to determine a bound on the error between
the fixed-point precision solution and the real solution of
the MPC problem (3). The total error is composed of the
error induced by having fixed-point coefficients and variables
in the optimization problem, and by the round-off errors.
Specifically, denote by UK the solution in exact arithmetic
of the MPC problem (3) obtained after K iterations of Al-
gorithm 1. Furthermore, denote by U˜K the solution obtained
after K iterations but with H,F, x(t),U , L, η replaced by
their fixed-point representations. Finally, denote by U¯K the
solution of Protocols 2 and 3 after K iterations, where
the iterates [[tk]], [[Uk]] have fixed-point representation, i.e,
truncations are performed. We obtain the following upper
bound on the difference between the solution obtained on
the encrypted data and the nominal solution of the implicit
MPC problem (3) after K iterations:
||U¯K − UK ||2 ≤ ||U˜K − UK ||2 + ||U¯K − U˜K ||2.
1) Quantization errors: We will use the following obser-
vation to investigate the quantization error bounds. Define
a = a¯− a and b = b¯− b. Then:
a¯b¯− ab = a¯b¯− a¯b+ a¯b− ab = ab+ a¯b.
Consider problem (3) where the coefficients are re-
placed by the fixed-point representations of the matrices
H/(cL), F/(cL), of the vector x(t) and of the set U , but
otherwise the iterates U˜k, t˜k, z˜k are real values. Now, con-
sider iteration k of the projected FGM. The errors induced by
quantization of the coefficients between the original iterates
and the approximation iterates will be:
t˜k − tk =− Hf zk + (INm − H¯f )z,k − Fx
ξqk+1 := U˜k+1 − Uk+1 = Dqk(t˜k − tk)
z˜k+1 − zk+1 = η∆Uk + (1 + η¯)ξqk+1 − η¯ξqk,
(4)
where we used the notation: ∆Uk = Uk+1−Uk; η = η¯ − η;
Hf = H¯f − H/(cL); Fx = F¯ ᵀf x¯(t) − F ᵀx(t)/(cL) =
ᵀFfx(t) + F¯f x; x = x¯(t)− x(t); Ff = F¯f − F/(cL).
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The error between U˜k+1 and Uk+1 is reduced from t˜k−tk
due to the projection on the hyperbox. Hence, to represent
ξqk+1 in (4), we multiply t˜k − tk by the diagonal matrix Dqk
that has positive elements at most one.
We set ξq−1 = ξ
q
0 . From (4), we derive a recursive iteration
that characterizes the error of the primal iterate, for k =
0, . . . ,K, which we can write as a linear system:
A˜(Dqk) :=
[
(1 + η¯)Dqk(INm − H¯f ) −η¯Dqk(INm − H¯f )
INm 0Nm
]
B˜(Dqk) :=
[−HfDqk ηDqk(INm − H¯f )
0Nm 0Nm
]
(5)[
ξqk+1
ξqk
]
=A˜(Dqk)
[
ξqk
ξqk−1
]
+ B˜(Dqk)
[
zk
∆Uk−1
]
− Fx.
We choose this representation in order to have a relevant
error bound in Theorem 3 that shrinks to zero as the number
of fractional bits grows. In the following, we find an upper
bound of the error using A˜ := A˜(INm) and B˜ := B˜(INm).
Theorem 3: Under Assumption 1, the system defined
by (5) is bounded. Furthermore, the norm of the error
between the primal iterates of the original problem and of
the problem with quantized coefficients is bounded by:
||ξqk||2 ≤
∣∣∣∣∣∣EA˜k∣∣∣∣∣∣
2
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣[ ξq0ξq−1
]∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
2
+ γ
k−1∑
l=0
∣∣∣∣∣∣EA˜k−1−lB˜∣∣∣∣∣∣
2
+
+ ζ
k−1∑
l=0
∣∣∣∣∣∣EA˜k−1−l∣∣∣∣∣∣
2
=: 1; γ = (3 + 2η¯)
√
NmRU¯ ,
ζ = ||Ff ||2R2X0 + 2−lf
√
n||F¯f ||2,
where E = [INm 0Nm], R2X0 is the radius of the compact
set X0 w.r.t. the 2-norm and RU¯ = max{||lu||∞, ||hu||∞}.
Proof: The inner stability of the system is given by the
fact that A˜ has spectral radius ρ(A˜) < 1 which is proven in
Lemma 1 in [47]. The same holds for A˜(Dqk). Since we want
to give a bound of the error in terms of computable values,
we use the fact that ||A˜(Dqk)||2 ≤ ||A˜||2 (resp., ||B˜(Dqk)||2 ≤
||B˜||2) and express the bounds in terms of the latter.
From (5), one can obtain the following expression for the
errors at time k and k − 1, for k = 0, . . . ,K − 1:[
ξqk
ξqk−1
]
≤ A˜k
[
ξq0
ξr−1
]
+
k−1∑
l=0
A˜k−1−l
(
B˜
[
zl
∆Ul−1
]
− Fx
)
,
and the first term goes to zero as k →∞. We multiply this
by E = [INm 0Nm] to obtain the expression of ||ξqk||.
Subsequently, for any 0 ≤ k ≤ K − 1:∣∣∣∣[zᵀk ∆Uᵀk−1]ᵀ∣∣∣∣2 = ||zk||2 + ||∆Uk−1||2,
≤ ||Uk + η¯∆Uk−1||2 + ||∆Uk||2 ≤ RU¯ + 2(1 + η¯)RU¯
≤ (3 + 2η¯)
√
Nm(max
i
{liu, hiu})2 := γ
||Fx||2 ≤ ||Ff ||2||x(t)||2 + ||F¯f ||2||x||2
≤ ||Ff ||2R2X0 + 2−lf
√
n||F¯f ||2 := ζ.
One can eliminate the initial error ξq0 and its effect by
choosing in both exact and fixed-point coefficient-FGM
algorithms the initial iterate to be represented on lf fractional
bits. Therefore, only the persistent noise counts.
Remark 2: In primal-dual algorithms, the maximum val-
ues of the dual variables corresponding to the complicating
constraints cannot be bounded a priori, i.e., we cannot
give overflow or coefficient quantization error bounds. This
justifies our focus on a problem with only simple input
constraints. The work in [48] considers the bound on the
dual variables as a parameter that can be tuned by the user.
2) Arithmetic round-off errors: Let us now investigate
the error between the solution of the previous problem
and the solution of the fixed-point FGM corresponding to
Protocols 2 and 3. The encrypted values do not necessarily
maintain the same number of bits after operations, so we will
consider round-off errors where we perform truncations. This
happens in line 10 in both protocols. In this case, we obtain
similar results to [47], where the quantization errors were not
analyzed, i.e., as if the nominal coefficients of the problem
were represented with lf fractional bits from the problem
formulation. Consider iteration k of the projected FGM. The
errors due to round-off between the primal iterates of the
two solutions will be:
t¯k − t˜k =(INm − H¯f )(z¯k − z˜k) + ′t,k
ξrk+1 :=U¯k+1 − U˜k+1 = Drk(t¯k − tk) (6)
z¯k+1 − z˜k+1 =(1 + η¯)ξrk+1 − η¯ξrk.
Again, the projection on the hyperbox reduces the error, so
Drk is a diagonal matrix with positive elements less than
one. For Protocol 2, the round-off error due to truncation
is (′t,k)
i ∈ [−Nm2−lf , 0], i = 1, . . . , Nm. The encrypted
truncation step in Protocol 3 introduces an extra term due to
blinding, making (′t,k)
i ∈ [−(1 +Nm)2−lf , 2−lf ].
We set set ξr−1 = ξ
r
0 . From (6), we can derive a recursive
iteration that characterizes the error of the primal iterate,
which we can write as a linear system, with A˜(·) as before:[
ξrk+1
ξrk
]
=A˜(Drk)
[
ξrk
ξrk−1
]
+Drk
′
t,k. (7)
Theorem 4: Under Assumption 1, the system defined
by (7) is bounded. Furthermore, the norm of the error of
the primal iterate is bounded by:
||ξrk||2 ≤
∣∣∣∣∣∣EA˜k∣∣∣∣∣∣
2
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣[ ξr0ξr−1
]∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
2
+ γ′
k−1∑
l=0
∣∣∣∣∣∣EA˜k−1−l∣∣∣∣∣∣
2
=: 2,
γ′CS =2
−lf (Nm)
3
2 ; γ′SS = 2
−lf√Nm(1 +Nm).
The proof is straightforward.
As before, one can eliminate the initial error ξr0 and its
effect by choosing the same initial iterate represented on lf
fractional bits for both problems.
Remark 3: As lf → ∞, 1 → 0 and 2 → 0. The
persistent noise in (5) and (7), which is composed by
quantization errors and round-off errors, becomes zero when
the number of fractional bits mimics a real variable. This
makes systems (5) and (7) input-to-state stable.
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B. Choice of error level
For every instance of problem (2), the error bound  :=
1 + 2 can be computed as a function of the number
of fractional bits lf . We can incorporate these errors as a
bounded disturbance d(·) in system (1): d(t) = Bξ(t), where
ξ(t) = u∗(t)−u¯(t). Then, we can design the terminal cost as
described in [37], such that the controller achieves inherent
robust stability to process perturbations ||d(t)||2 ≤ δ, and
choose:  ≤ δ||B|| . Alternatively, we can incorporate the error
in the suboptimality of the cost and assume that we obtain
a cost J¯N (x(t), U¯K) ≤ J∗N (x(t)) + ′, and compute  such
that asymptotic stability is achieved as in [49].
In the offline phase, the fixed-point precision of the
variables (the number of integer bits li and the number of
fractional bits lf ) is chosen such that there is no overflow
and one of the conditions on  is satisfied. Note that these
conditions can be overly-conservative. This ensures that the
MPC performance is guaranteed with a large margin, but the
computation is slower because of the large number of bits.
Remark 4: Instead of the FGM, we can use the simple
gradient descent method, where fewer errors accumulate, and
less memory is needed, but more iterations are necessary to
reach to the optimal solution.
Once li and lf have been chosen, we can pick Nσ such
that the there is no overflow in Protocol 2 and Protocol 3,
respectively. In Protocol 2, truncation cannot be done on
encrypted data by the server, thus, the multiplications by
2lf are accumulated between zk and tk, which means that
tk is multiplied by 23lf . Hence, we choose Nσ such that
li + 3lf + 2 < log2(Nσ/3) holds. For Protocol 3 we pick
Nσ such that li+3lf+3+λσ < log2(Nσ/3) holds, where λσ
is the statistical security parameter. If the Nσ that satisfies
these requirements is too large, one should use the simple
gradient method, which will have multiplications up to 22lf .
VII. NUMERICAL RESULTS AND TRADE-OFF
The number of bits in the representation is crucial for
the performance of the MPC scheme. At the same time, a
more accurate representation slows down the private MPC
computation.
In Figure 4, for a toy model of a spacecraft from [50] and
based on [51], we compare the predicted theoretical error
bounds from Theorems 3 and 4 and the norm of the actual er-
rors between the control input obtained with the client-server
protocol and the control input of the unencrypted MPC. The
simulation is run for a time step of MPC with 18 iterations,
with three choices of the number of fractional bits: 16, 24 and
32 bits. The results are similar for the two-server protocol.
We can observe that the predicted errors are around two
orders of magnitude larger than the real errors caused by
the encryption, and even for 16 bits of precision, the actual
error is small.
Furthermore, we implemented the above two protocols for
various problem sizes. Table I shows the computation times
for Protocols 2 and 3 for li = 16 integer bits and lf ∈
{16, 32} fractional bits. We fix the number of iterations to
50. The times obtained vary linearly with the number of
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18
Iterations
10-8
10-6
10-4
10-2
100
102
104
In
pu
t E
rro
r [%
]
Difference between predicted and actual error
in percentage from the norm of the true value
Predicted l f=16
Actual l f=16
Predicted l f=24
Actual l f=24
Predicted l f=32
Actual l f=32
Fig. 4. Predicted and actual errors for the control input computed in
Protocol 2 for the Problem (3). The y-axis shows the errors (predicted and
actual) as a percentage of the norm of the true iterate Uk .
iterations, so one can approximate how long it would take to
run a different number of iterations. The size of the Nσ for
the encryption is chosen to be 512 bits. The computations
have been effectuated on a 2.2 GHz Intel Core i7.
lf
n = 2
m = 2
n = 5
m = 5
n = 10
m = 10
n = 20
m = 20
n = 50
m = 30
CS 16 1.21 4.08 13.38 39.56 84.28
CS 32 1.33 5.20 15.46 53.48 105.84
SS 16 23.27 59.81 123.19 261.75 457.87
SS 32 31.21 91.74 170.62 372.42 579.38
TABLE I
AVERAGE EXECUTION TIME IN SECONDS FOR PROTOCOLS 2, 3.
The larger the number of fractional bits, the larger is
the execution time, because the computations involve larger
numbers and more bits have to be sent from one party to
another in the case of encrypted comparisons. Communi-
cation is the reason for the significant slow-down observed
in the two-server architecture compared to the client-server
architecture. Performing the projection with PHE requires l
communication rounds, where l is the number of bits of the
messages compared. Privately updating the iterates requires
another communication round. However, the assumption is
that the servers are powerful computers, and the execution
time can be greatly improved using parallelization and more
efficient data structures.
To summarize, privacy comes at the price of complexity:
hiding the private data requires working with large encrypted
numbers, and the computations on private data require com-
munication. Furthermore, the more parties that need to be
oblivious to the private data (two servers in the second
architecture compared to one server in the first architecture),
the more complex the private protocols become.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have presented two methods to achieve
the private computation of the solution to cloud-outsourced
implicit MPC, through additively homomorphic encryption.
The client, which is the owner of a linear-time discrete
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system with input constraints, desires to keep the mea-
surements, the constraints and the control inputs private.
The cloud, which can be composed by one or two servers,
knows the parameters of the system and has to relieve the
computation, i.e., solving the optimization problems, from
the client in a private manner. The first method proposes
an architecture where the computation is split between the
client and one server. The client encrypts the current state
with a PHE scheme, and performs the nonlinear operations
(the projection on the constraints), while the server performs
the rest of the computations needed to solve the optimization
problem via the fast gradient method. Secondly, we propose
a two-server architecture, in which the client is exempt
from any computations apart from encrypting the state and
decrypting the input. The two servers engage in a protocol
to solve the optimization problem and use communication
to perform the nonlinear operations on encrypted data. We
prove that both protocols are private for semi-honest servers.
In order to use encryptions, we map the real values to
rational fixed-point values. We analyze the errors introduced
by the associated quantization and round-off errors and give
upper bounds which can be used to choose an appropriate
precision that corresponds to performance requirements on
the MPC. Furthermore, we implement the two proposed
protocols and perform numerical tests.
The two architectures proposed in this paper offer insights
for a more common architecture met in practice of multiple
clients and one server, which we will consider in future work.
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